

Nuclear Energy

Station Blackout: A case study in the interaction of mechanistic and probabilistic safety analysis

Curtis Smith, Diego Mandelli, Cristian Rabiti

Idaho National Laboratory (INL)







RISMC strategic goals

■ Goals of the RISMC Pathway:

- Develop and demonstrate a risk-assessment method coupled to safety margin quantification that can be used by nuclear plant decision makers as part of their margin management strategies
- 2. Create advanced "RISMC toolkit" that enables more accurate representation of nuclear plant safety margin








What is RISMC?

- Loads & capacities are uncertain and can be treated probabilistically
 - When deterministic margins are evaluated, the analysis is typically very conservative in order to account for uncertainties
- RISMC uses the probability-margin approach to quantify impacts in order to avoid conservatisms (where possible) and treat uncertainties






What is RISMC (cont.)?

- Two types of analysis used in RISMC, probabilistic and mechanistic
 - In applications, a blended approach is used where both types of analysis are combined to support a particular decision

Decisions to be Supported (e.g., better understanding of SBO, improved SDP, power uprates, aging management)






The types of decisions that will be assisted by RISMC

- Risk-Informed Margin Management will support a variety of safety margin decisions, including recovery of or increasing safety margins...
 - If core power levels are increased
 - If a different type of fuel or clad is introduced
 - If aging phenomena becomes more active over long periods of plant operation
 - If advanced control systems provide additional or new information during normal and off-normal plant operation
 - If plant modifications are taken to increase resiliency for hazards such as flooding and seismic events
 - If systems, structures, or components are degraded or failed
 - If under accident conditions, supporting severe accident guidelines



SBO Test Case: Overview

- Plant considered: BWR with Mark I containment
- Test case: Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) + Loss of Diesel Generators
- Objectives:
 - Evaluate impact of power uprate on LOOP+SBO accident scenario
 - Show capabilities of simulation based PRA through RISMC
 - Compare results with classical PRA tools (SAPHIRE)






Test Case: Overview


Items considered

- Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level control:
 - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)
 - High and Low Pressure Core Injection (HPCI and LPCI)
- RPV pressure control:
 - Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) including ADS
- Containment:
 - Drywell (DW)
 - Suppression Pool (SP)
- Reactor pump seal
- Firewater injection system
- Operators
- Power Systems
 - Battery systems (DC systems)
 - Normal and emergency AC Power systems:
 - Power-grid
 - DGs





Test Case: Scenario Example






Methodology and Tools

■ Current Tools

- SAPHIRE: reliability data
- RELAP-5, RELAP-7: T/H simulation
- RAVEN: stochastic analysis

Methodology

Series of independent RELAP runs






Simulation Info

- Monte-Carlo analysis:
 - 20,000 LOOP+SBO sequences
- Stopping conditions:
 - AC power restored
 - Max clad temperature reached
 - Max containment pressure reached
- No severe accident analysis considered
- Operator actions considered

#	Stochastic human interventions
1	Manual ADS activation
2	Firewater injection
3	Extended ECCS operation (battery life)
4	Increase CST capacity
5	Containment (SP) venting




Impact on timing of events





- Limit surface: boundaries in the input space between failure and success
 - DG failure time vs. AC power recovery time



AC recovery time [s] failure * success 0.5 1.5 2.5 DG failure time [s] x 10⁴

120% power



Conclusions


- RISMC case study aims to risk-inform decision makers about impact of power uprate on system safety
 - Provides information for Risk Informed Margins Management
- Analysis is performed using both classical and dynamic PRA methods
 - Simulation-based tools could be used to validate classical PRA approaches
- New algorithms have been also developed:
 - Simulation of systems, components, and operators
 - Limit surface evaluation
 - Data analysis tools




Backup Slides




■ Impact on timing of events









- Limit surface: boundaries in the input space between failure and success
 - Battery life vs. firewater injection time








Impact of HP injection failure time (both RCIC and HPCI)





Analysis of the 20K runs

- Sensitivity analysis of uncertain parameters on final simulation outcome and margin analysis
- Metrics:
 - Max core temperature (success cases)
 - Time to reach core damage (fail cases)





Analysis of the 20K runs

- Sensitivity analysis of uncertain parameters on final simulation outcome and margin analysis
- Metrics:
 - Max core temperature (success cases)
 - <u>Time to reach core damage (fail cases)</u>

